When President Bush released his new plan to send 20,000 additional troops to Iraq, he faced
widespread condemnation from Democratic leaders (who attempted to pass a resolution opposing the plan, which was fillibustered by Republicans) and the public (with over 60% of Americans disapproving of the plan a month after it was proposed) (Washington Post). In his
State of the Union address for 2007, the president told the nation to "give [the surge] a chance to work." Indeed, the administration has left itself with no other options, as indicated by a National Security Council spokesman's
statement that the administration did not "discuss any contingency-type planning" (Washington Post). So does this new strategy, relied upon by the administration, have a hope of success? Currently, the surge has made little progress; its slight reductions in violence have been undermined by its failure to address divisions within Iraq.
While the surge has reduced the number of sectarian killings in Baghdad by 60%, car bombings are up by 30%, including over 150
civilian deaths on Wednesday in some of the deadliest attacks by Iraqi groups since the war began. The U.S. top commander in Iraq, General David Petraeus, has acknowledged that the s
uicide bombers will be impossible to stop completely (Washington Post). U.S. Lieutenant General Martin Dempsey stated on Sunday that the
only way to prevent suicide bombings was for Iraqi forces and civilians to work together against terrorist cells (International Herald Tribune), meaning the US military has little ability to control Iraq's security regardless of US intentions.
Furthermore, military experts concluded early that the
surge would see relatively large gains early in its implementation before insurgent groups changed their tactics to counter new U.S. strategies (Washington Post). Thus, the mild gains currently achieved may represent a high water mark, not a beginning.
Sectarian cooperation is seen as the key factor in solving the Iraq puzzle. A
National Intelligence Estimate released on February 3, before the surge was under way, indicated that Iraq would disintegrate if sectarian tensions continue, regardless of the security situation (Washington Post). But the US military has done little to resolve sectarian tensions, and in some ways exacerbated them. Consider, for example, the recent outcry over US plans to build a 12-foot high, 3-mile
wall that separates Sunni and Shiite areas in the capital (BBC). While such walls are intended to prevent suicide bombings by restricting movement of terrorists, they are also certain to increase divisions between Shiite and Sunni groups, and have been
condemned by both Sunni leaders and Shiite Prime Minster Nouri al-Maliki (New York Times). Iraq citizens separated from each other by sect will have no incentive to find shared solutions to problems, so building a wall is counter-intuitive to peace and stability.
Furthermore, the United States military has continued to use tactics that increase sectarian rivalries. For example, some soldiers attempt to find information from captives by
threatening to turn them over to the Iraqi army, which is known for
brutally treating captives (New York Times). Such torture is often linked to sectarian allegiances. Sectarian rivalries are especially important in the Iraqi police force, in which many Shiite members of death squads and militias hold sway. While American forces
publicly oppose such action, they continue to support the government of Prime Minister Maliki, who has turned a blind eye to such killings. The surge thus does not address this root cause of Iraqi violence.
What is the alternative to the U.S. plan? Well, we might look to the Iraqis for help on decreasing tensions--the Iraqi militia leader Moktada al-Sadr recently
pulled six lawmakers out of the Iraqi government for the stated reason that he wished to allow more non-partisan figures in power. While Sadr may also have wished to put pressure on Maliki to set a timetable for U.S. withdrawal, his action still carries out his stated purpose of allowing a reduction in rivalry. Other Iraqi leaders have called for reductions in tensions, with Shiite cleric Iyad Jamaleddin, former foreign minister Adnan Pachachi, and former interim prime minister Ayad Allawi attempting to
forge a new secular democratic alliance in Iraq called the National Front (Washington Post). Sunni insurgents in Iraq have recently begun to
disown Al-Qaeda. If the we wants to end the violence in Iraq, we must support such efforts and allow the Iraqis to make their own security, not build walls between them.
RE right to privacy: The Supreme Court found in 1967's Katz v. United States that a person's conversations are protected by the fourth amendment (law is at http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=389&invol=347 with a simple summary at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Katz_v._United_States ).
Now, if an intelligence agency gets a court order, then everything is "reasonable" and they can snoop all they want. But if it's easier for the FBI to wiretap, it makes sense for them to seek more court orders. Thus, privacy concerns.